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Abstract 
The literature on European legal mobilization asks why individuals, groups and companies go 
to court and explores the impact of litigation on policy, institutions and the balance of power 
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among actors. Surveying the literature we find that legal mobilization efforts vary across policy 
areas and jurisdictions. This article introduces a three-level theoretical framework that 
organises research on the causes of these variations: macro-level systemic factors that originate 
in Europe, meso-level factors that vary nationally, and micro-level factors that characterise the 
actors engaged in (or disengaged from) litigation. We argue that until we understand more 
about how and why different parties mobilise law, it is difficult to respond to normative 
questions about whether European legal mobilization is a positive or negative development for 
democracy and rights.  
 




A growing literature explores how individuals, groups, and companies use European law to 
pursue their interests. The process of European integration generated a new opportunity 
structure for legal mobilization that expanded over several decades. Postwar commitments to 
peace and prosperity, as well as democracy and human rights, inspired the original ‘European 
Union’ (EU) treaties and European Convention on Human Rights (Convention), both of 
which constitute sources of European law. Functional imperatives to realise the Single 
Market led the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to issue judgments – in cooperation with 
national courts – that ‘constitutionalised’ the EU into an unprecedented supranational polity, 
vesting EU citizens with substantive rights and procedural guarantees. Meanwhile, the 
development of universal individual access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
offered another means to claim rights (Shelton 2003). Private litigants mobilising these two 
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sets of rights have made these European courts the world’s busiest international tribunals 
(Alter 2013). 
Normatively, the consequences of this mobilization are contested. Disagreement 
about the extent to which the growing emphasis on rights threatens (Dehousse 2000) or 
enhances (Cichowski 2006) democratic accountability in Europe parallels broader debates 
about the democratizing or elitist consequences of postwar ‘rights revolutions’ and 
‘juristocracies’ within national democracies (Epp 1998; Hirschl 2004). Some see a challenge 
to social democracy, where court-propelled negative integration liberalises markets and 
outpaces the positive integration that could ameliorate the weakening of national social 
policies (Höpner and Schäfer 2010, Martinsen 2015; Scharpf 2010). Others uncover judicial 
efforts to expand European social rights by extending national benefits to migrating EU 
citizens and third-country family members (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; Conant 2006; Wind 
2009). Such generosity fuels backlash against ‘welfare migration’ (Blauberger and Schmidt 
2014; Martinsen 2015), which resulted in judicial retrenchment (Larsson and Naurin 2016) 
and threats to the legitimacy of the EU and Convention. Arguments about EU immigrants 
exploiting national welfare systems and ‘meddling courts’ contributed to the victorious 
‘Brexit’ campaign of the United Kingdom’s (UK) referendum on EU membership. Similarly, 
litigation that foils efforts to deport foreign terrorist suspects and criminal convicts (Conant 
2016) features prominently in frustration with the ECtHR and the constraints its interpretation 
of the Convention imposes (Conservatives 2015). Far from an obscure domain, legal 
mobilization has become politically salient. 
Empirically, disagreements persist about factors underlying these developments. 
Daniel Kelemen (2011) argues that formal law, lawyers, and litigation play a growing role in 
EU policymaking in contrast to traditional regulatory styles that featured more informal, 
cooperative, or technocratic relations among participants in West European states. Tracing 
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the origins of this change to economic liberalization within a fragmented EU political 
structure, Kelemen sees a diffusion of US ‘adversarial legalism’ theorised by Robert Kagan 
(2001). By contrast, Kagan (2008) expects that entrenched national cultural and legal 
institutions impede adversarial legalism in Europe. Comparative accounts uncover the uneven 
extent to which European legal mobilization affects policy and democratic governance 
(Blauberger and Kelemen 2017; Cichowski 2007; Conant 2002). We need to learn more 
about the sources of these variations. 
We propose to organise research on the causes of variations into three levels of 
analysis: macro-level systemic factors that originate in Europe, meso-level factors that vary 
nationally, and micro-level factors that characterise the actors engaged in (or disengaged 
from) litigation. The following sections outline contributions within each emphasis, which 
span a variety of literatures including comparative law and politics, international law and 
politics, and socio-legal studies. While we are aware that broader conceptions exist (Vanhala 
2011a), our discussion focuses on European legal mobilization in the narrow sense of private 
litigants engaging in court proceedings based on a European source of law, be it EU law or 
the Convention. Until we understand more about how and why different parties mobilise law, 
and how national and European institutions mediate the impact of this activity, it is difficult 
to respond to normative questions about whether European legal mobilization is a positive or 
negative development for democracy and rights.  
Macro-level factors: European legal opportunities  
An important source of variation in legal mobilization includes the impulses that derive from 
European law. What are the macro level factors that encourage and discourage litigation? 
How have the shifting legal norms and institutional arrangements of the EU and the 
Convention shaped the rules of the game for potential litigants? While we have only begun to 
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explore some of these questions empirically, it is clear that ‘integration through law’ 
(Cappelletti et al. 1986) has been uneven. 
Historically, integration gave preference to some actors and policy areas, leading to a 
process of ‘co-evolution’ (Baumgartner et al. 2003). With its original emphasis on economic 
rights, EU law primarily offered opportunities to companies and workers who could benefit 
from regional market liberalization. Companies have been adept at challenging national 
product standards and labour and tax laws that they interpreted as restrictions to their free 
movement rights (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2011, Seikel 2015). The EU legislator is 
moreover actively fostering a framework for private litigation in issues of competition and 
public procurement (Eliantonio and Muir 2015). Market-correcting policies such as consumer 
and environmental law developed later, but now increasingly offer an opportunity for interest 
group litigation. Individual claims were long limited to contesting how nationality or gender 
discrimination affected employment and related welfare entitlements (Cichowski 2007; 
Conant 2004; Hofmann 2013). The growth of new groups and individual claims concerning 
broader fundamental rights paralleled the expanding activities of the EU’s courts and 
legislature (Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). Broadly applicable anti-discrimination 
measures were not available until a 1999 EU Treaty change, which subsequently led to the 
passing of the Race Equality Directive (Evans Case and Givens 2010). The CJEU was long 
prevented from fully reviewing topics involving the EU’s area of ‘freedom, security and 
justice’, such as migration and asylum. It only more recently became the focal point of legal 
mobilization efforts by migrants and their supporters in contrast to the more prominent 
position of the ECtHR in this area (Psychogiopolou 2014). EU law proper - overseen by the 
CJEU - did not contain a single, written catalogue of individual rights until the 2000 Charter 
of Fundamental Rights became legally binding with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. While the 
CJEU has begun to issue more human rights rulings, its human rights caseload does not 
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compare to that of the ECtHR. The ECtHR is more directly accessible to societal actors, but 
the presence of a competing quasi-constitutional framework in Europe illustrates what polls 
have consistently shown - European citizens are confused about or unaware of their European 
rights. Even experts continue to debate the relationship of the Charter and the Convention to 
other aspects of EU and national law, underlining the complexity that societal actors wanting 
to mobilise European law must navigate. This context helps explain why many social 
movements have long shown a relatively low degree of Europeanization, as EU law offered 
little to them and requires adaptation to its complexities. Most grass root organizations limit 
their activities to the national or local level (Monforte 2014). It remains unclear whether the 
trajectory of European legal mobilization will eventually encompass the broader ‘rights 
revolutions’ seen within national democracies (Epp 1998). 
Institutionally, the EU is a distinctive multi-level system of governance whose 
structure shapes the presence and preferences of political actors and favours some players 
over others (Scharpf 2010). The quantity of players involved in decision-making frequently 
creates gridlock. As a result, actors ‘shopping’ for the right venue to maximise their interests 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009) will often end up before courts, whose incremental and case-
specific decision-making leads to surprising and uneven demands for policy changes 
(Schmidt 2012). When controversy strikes, the CJEU has proven well insulated against any 
‘court curbing’ measures (Kelemen 2012 but see Larsson and Naurin 2016). Yet Brexit and 
the recent surge in europhobia across the continent suggest we need to be more attentive to 
risks that insulated legal arenas pose if their exclusive access and focus inspire mass 
backlash. 
Meso-level factors: national legal opportunities 
The mobilization of European law is also dependent on the legal channels available to 
potential litigants who face distinct opportunities and obstacles across legal systems. Such 
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‘legal opportunity structures’ (Evans Case and Givens, 2010; Hilson, 2002) filter the way that 
European law impacts national policies. The national judiciary’s operations are only partially 
regulated by the Convention, EU law and case law. Among the most litigated Convention 
provisions, Article 6 violations of the right to a fair trial identify systemic problems with the 
length of proceedings in many states (Cichowski 2006). Meanwhile, the CJEU has repeatedly 
stated that national legal procedures must constitute an effective means of enforcing EU 
rights, and that it must not be more difficult to enforce EU rights than it is to enforce national 
rights. EU legislation increasingly includes procedural provisions, but harmonization is 
limited by the principle of procedural autonomy (Eliantonio and Muir 2015). 
Which attributes of a legal system contribute to a legal opportunity structure that is 
conducive to legal mobilization? Studies on the national reception of European law have 
often grouped countries according to their legal family or tradition, emphasising the 
distinction between civil law and common law countries, but it is doubtful that this 
distinction describes meaningful differences in the use of courts and the practical effects of 
litigation (Alter 2009). Important variation even within these families include the degree of 
judicial independence, the possibility for judicial review of legislation or administrative acts, 
the incorporation of the Convention with constitutional or statutory status and the ability of 
courts to control their docket (Alter 2009; Epp, 1998; Keller and Stone Sweet 2008, 
Soennecken 2016). These characteristics vary nationally. In addition, opportunities for 
litigation are structured along national rules governing ‘access to justice’, a key concept in 
litigation research, which includes rights of standing and costs (Evans Case and Givens 2010; 
Hilson 2002). Such rights vary both cross-nationally and between subject matters. Some 
systematic comparisons exist, in particular for the areas of non-discrimination (European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011) and the environment (Darpö 2013). Standing 
rules vary particularly regarding the possibility to bring cases on behalf of somebody else or 
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in the public interest (Evans Case and Givens 2010), with, e.g., fairly liberal rules in the UK 
and restrictive rules in Germany, where showing individual concern is a general requirement. 
Conversely, the lack of individual opportunity to bring constitutional challenges in, e.g., the 
UK in contrast to Germany and Spain, creates incentives to mobilise the ECtHR. The costs of 
bringing a dispute to court also vary in important aspects (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2011). Some countries, such as the UK, require a fee to bring a case to 
court, which increases upon appeal. All EU member states offer legal aid that alleviates 
litigation costs for persons of limited means, but differences exist concerning the extent of 
such aid, in particular whether it is available to interest groups or covers representation by a 
lawyer. Some countries require representation by a lawyer in certain kinds of cases (e.g., 
Germany), whereas no such requirement exists in others (e.g., Sweden). Lawyer fees are 
capped in some countries (e.g., Germany), but not others (e.g., the UK). ‘Loser pays’ 
arrangements, where the losing party has to cover the legal costs of the winner, can make 
engaging in legal proceedings a risky exercise (Vanhala 2012). Other sources of variation in 
opportunity structures for litigation are factors such as the length of legal proceedings, time 
limits on bringing claims to court, and the availability of legal insurance or alternative dispute 
settlement mechanisms (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011). National 
differences persist despite increasing efforts by EU institutions to improve access to justice 
across the EU, both through specific access to justice initiatives and the inclusion of 
procedural standards in substantive legislation, a development that has been termed an 
‘incidental proceduralisation’ of EU law (Eliantonio and Muir 2015). 
Focusing on legal opportunity structures misses another factor: the availability of 
alternative political opportunities for influence (Bouwen and McCown 2007; Hilson 2002). It 
is in this aspect that research on legal mobilization should interact more closely with research 
on lobbying and interest group politics (Beyers et al. 2008, Klüver et al. 2015, Saurugger and 
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Terpan 2017, Hofmann forthcoming). The degree of a political system’s openness to interest 
representation structures the incentives of individuals, groups and companies to turn to 
European law and the courts. Chris Hilson points out that such incentives are not only 
dependent on structural access to political institutions, but also their more contingent 
receptiveness to certain political arguments. Ideological congruence between political 
decision-makers and individuals, groups or companies seeking influence increases the latters’ 
political opportunity. Similarly, legal opportunity goes beyond structural access to courts and 
includes the receptiveness of national judges and other officials to certain legal arguments 
such as those based in European law (von Staden forthcoming; Hilson 2002). Attitudes can 
be shown to vary in important and systematic ways. For example, Marlene Wind (2010) has 
argued that a preference for majoritarian democracy and the lack of a tradition of judicial 
review explains the reluctance of Scandinavian judges to fully endorse European law. Legal 
culture, or culturally shared values and attitudes towards law and legal procedures (Nelken 
2004), is not just shared among the judiciary, but also among the wider public. Based on 
survey data, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira (1996) find significant cross-national 
differences regarding the valuation of individual liberty, support for the rule of law, and 
perceptions of the neutrality of law. The authors expect such differences to play a central role 
in how European law impacts national policies, but there are few empirical tests of this 
proposition. 
Methodologically, empirical research on the varying mobilization of EU law across 
national legal systems has largely been based on data relating to national judges’ use of the 
preliminary reference procedure (Mayoral 2016). These procedures, however, cover the 
slimmest portion of cases concerning EU law (Bobek 2016; Kelemen and Pavone 2016). 
There is little evidence to establish whether reference rates to the CJEU are a valid proxy for 
the litigation of EU law in national courts. The much higher rate of registered applications to 
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the ECtHR than references to the CJEU suggests that references are poor reflections of 
‘demand’ for European redress (Conant 2016). Comparing reference rates may therefore tell 
us too little about cross-national opportunities and obstacles for EU law litigation. A better 
baseline to assess legal opportunities would be litigation rates more broadly. National legal 
systems vary in the amount of cases they generate. Systematic comparative data is rare 
(Wollschläger 1998), but the newly introduced ‘EU Justice scoreboard’ may prove a valuable 
data-source. There is now also research on subnational variation in the use of courts 
(Kelemen and Pavone 2016), which suggests that any comparative analysis of legal 
mobilization should justify its unit of analysis.  
Micro-level factors: agent characteristics 
A critique of approaches that focus on the macro- and meso-level alone is that they tend to 
treat litigants as if they were black boxes. In doing so, they ignore agent-level characteristics 
that influence whether individuals, groups or companies will turn to the courts (Vanhala 
2011b). Therefore, a third prong of the analytical framework presented here lies at the micro-
level and focuses on the potential litigants themselves and their relationships with each other 
and with state institutions. This section presents four factors that have been identified in the 
existing literature as agent-level explanatory variables in accounting for variance in 
propensities to mobilise the law. 
First, the perceptions of potential litigants need to be accounted for. Individuals, 
groups and companies need to perceive the legal opportunities available to them in order to 
mobilise the law (Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003). This requires at least minimal levels of 
a European ‘legal consciousness’ – that is, understandings and meanings of law circulating 
among social relations (Silbey 2005) – among an organization’s leadership and/or 
membership. Marc Hertogh (2004) has argued that there is a European understanding of legal 
consciousness that is distinctive from its American counterpart. The latter, he argues, is 
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concerned with how people experience (official) law whereas the European variant is 
concerned with addressing the question: what do people experience as ‘law’? One treats law 
as the independent variable and the other as the dependent variable. Hertogh recommends 
unifying these approaches, and future research could apply these understandings to unpack 
how legal consciousness matters differently across various national settings, communities and 
policy areas. 
Second, existing research has shown how pivotal resources can be in explaining the 
mobilization of European law. Findings on European legal mobilization have tended to fall in 
line with the idea that ‘the haves come out ahead’ (Galanter 1974). For example, Tanja 
Börzel (2006) found that decentralised EU law enforcement mechanisms increase 
opportunities for participation of environmental NGOs, but only if they possess domestic 
court access and sufficient resources to use it. ‘Resources’ have been defined in different 
ways in existing literature: from relatively narrow understandings that focus on financial 
resources to broader interpretations that include in-house lawyers and/or access to networks 
of pro bono legal advice (Cichowski 2016; Conant 2016; Epp 1998; Vanhala 2016). To date 
there has been little research that unpacks this. Does differentiating among types of resources 
offer better explanations of the role of resources in explaining variations in legal mobilization 
activity (e.g. material versus legal resources)? The literature on the role of cause lawyers has 
expanded to include European case studies. For example, Israël (2014) challenges 
conventional accounts of the rise of rights-consciousness in France, arguing that practicing 
lawyers and movement activists have been more important than European courts. More 
systematic theorising and comparative case studies could help elucidate the role that legal 
staff play in European legal mobilization dynamics. 
A third body of work shows how identity politics influences the likelihood that law is 
mobilised. This work focuses primarily on interest groups as the unit of analysis but these 
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findings may be relevant for corporations and individual litigants as well. While the identity 
of an organization is interlinked with perceptions a group holds, it refers here to static or 
slowly-changing features of group culture. Ideological approaches may become sources of 
conflict or consensus within a group and may steer the group towards the use of particular 
tactics and strategies. For example, research reveals that groups that define themselves 
according to a human rights-based approach to their policy work are more inclined to rely on 
litigation because the courts are understood as the appropriate venue to pursue rights claims 
(Doherty and Hayes 2014; Jacquot and Vitale 2014; Vanhala 2009). Recent research also 
shows that groups, for example some trade unions, prefer to find collective national solutions 
to labour relations issues even when opportunities may exist in EU law (Guillaume 2015). 
Potential litigants’ identity and culture matters yet we have little understanding about the 
extent it matters across contexts and how these factors interact with meso-level factors (but 
see Hilson 2002). 
A fourth theoretical approach focuses on relational issues. This can include the 
relationships individuals, groups and companies have (1) with various branches of 
government and/or (2) with each other. This approach stems back to research that argued that 
those who are ‘politically disadvantaged’ or ‘outsiders’ in the legislative or executive 
branches are more likely to turn to the judicial arena to pursue their political objectives than 
‘insiders’ (Cortner 1968; Vanhala 2009). This can be influenced by generational changes 
within an organization and attitudes towards conflict with state institutions (Morag-Levine 
2003) or by structural features of state institutions. For example, socio-legal research on neo-
corporatism has found that under some circumstances civil society-state partnerships have a 
chilling effect on legal mobilization and encourage groups to utilise other venues 
(Soennecken 2008), whereas under other conditions they facilitate litigation (Vanhala 2016). 
The relationships among individuals, groups and companies have also been shown to shape 
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the propensity to mobilise law (Alter and Vargas 2000). What remains to be explored is the 
conditions under which cooperative, competitive and conflictual dynamics are most likely to 
influence choice of tactics, including legal mobilization. Literature on interest group politics 
offers a promising place to start, and comparative research, of both the small-n and large-n 
variety, could help to elucidate patterns.  
Conclusions 
In this contribution we introduce a three-level framework for explaining EU legal 
mobilization. We believe it delineates the range of explanatory factors that scholars have 
examined in an unsystematic fashion in accounting for legal mobilization. This framework 
elucidates a number of research puzzles and gaps and offers a theoretical way forward. 
First, we highlight that the mobilization of European law is something that happens 
primarily at the national level. Much attention focuses on the few cases that reach European 
courts but the bulk of relevant cases never make it this far. More emphasis needs to be placed 
on national courts, and national courts of first instance in particular. Very little data is currently 
available on how European law is used at these lower levels of national legal systems. 
Developing more systematic insights would highlight patterns against which individual case 
studies could be contrasted. While we have focused on litigation, legal mobilization in the 
broader sense of an ‘assertion of rights’ (Zemans 1983) also occurs outside the courtroom. 
Future research could adopt this de-centered view to identify the role of actors who are 
overlooked by litigation-focused approaches. 
Second, this analytical framework uncovers the uneven nature of legal mobilization 
across Europe. Future theorising can draw on this synthetic framework to account for 
variation more systematically. While our framework focuses on Europe, the same three-level 
distinction applies to other situations where international law fosters local legal mobilization, 
and opens the possibility for cross-regional comparison (Alter and Helfer 2009). 
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Methodologically scholars should specify which source of variation they are investigating 
and design their research to hold factors at other levels of analysis constant. In the absence of 
such strategic research design, we risk studies that are overdetermined, creating theoretical 
explanations that do not travel across countries or policy areas, and overlooking negative 
outcomes on the dependent variable. 
Third, sources of variation in legal mobilization differ depending on the type of 
participating actors. Much of the literature has focused on interest groups, while less research 
focuses on individuals and companies as litigants. This is unfortunate. The question of how 
citizens claim rights lies at the core of the normative argument about the effects of legal 
mobilization on democratic politics. Litigation by comparatively resourceful companies on 
the other hand underlies the argument that EU law contributes to a liberal transformation of 
social market economies. At the same time, little is known about why some companies 
litigate and others do not. While we believe that private litigants are the main drivers, 
litigation by public authorities also contributes to changes in Europe. In the EU, the 
Commission has used litigation against national governments to pursue its policy objectives 
(Schmidt 2000, Hofmann 2013), and national governments also engage in litigation against 
the Commission (Adam et al. 2016).   
Finally, our limited understanding about the causes of variance in legal mobilization 
across Europe also implies that we should be careful about the normative conclusions we 
draw. Greater empirical insight into how individuals and interest groups use courts will allow 
us to discern whether European law can be a weapon of the weak or remains a ‘hollow hope’ 
(Rosenberg 1991). Better data on who litigates can reveal the degree of bias in EU law, an 
investigation that bears similarities to the theoretical discussion on an unbiased interest group 
system in Europe and offers opportunities to combine these agendas (Lowery et al. 2015). 
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